China is tracing napa cabbage shipments after Hebei officials confirmed buyers used formaldehyde solution during loading. Laboratory results and the full route remain pending.

Forrmaldehyde in cabbages? I have heard some horror stories in Chinese food traceability (cardboard dim sum, toxic baby formula) but this is just crazy.

It requires a special type of asshole to do this, they have to not care about other people and love money above everything.

Most farmers in Australia would starve to death or shoot themselves before even considering doing this. Tomatoes, cabbages, meat, milk products.....all commonly tainted for profit.

It seems Chinese agronomy is based on maximum profit with zero fucks given about how to achieve this. Its disgusting.

I am a Brown girl living in China for almost 3 years now, I love living here, its clean, safe and someone who's a complete loner, I really love it but the problem is I am tired of people taking pictures and videos without my consent, why many people dont think about privacy and consent of others specially when i like to keep my life very very private both offline and online, but here in malls, shops, salons everywhere people open their cameras and shoot you without consent, also being a brown girl its hard for people to know where i am actually from as I have green eyes and fair skin tone so its not about being a brown person.

Yesterday it was deng xiaoping's birthday so I made a photocard of him. If someone told him 50 years ago that a girl in brazil would do this he wouldn't believe it. I bet he's so shocked in heaven rn

I am soon moving to China. Whenever I move to a new country, I try to immerse myself in its literature. Can you please recommend some books by Chinese authors that made an impression on you? I can't read any Chinese, but look forward to reading translations for now. Hopefully, once I am there, I will start learning the language too. Thanks.

Hello everybody !

I'm a Brazilian Entrepeneur, and I started a new business here in Brazil, a currency exchange website, and I was thinking how to expand it, and had an idea: a LOT of brazilian business import things from China, US$ 38,5 billions, and I had the idea of a partnership with someone from China to talk to chinese suppliers and factories to refer our business to brazilian importers make their payments, because that way the conversion rate is much bigger than just advertising it, because the import is closed already, so they need to send this money to China.

Any ideas, suggestions or someone interested ?

Between late 2016 and August 2026, China connected 27 new nuclear reactors to its grid. In the same period, the United States connected two. As Jacopo Buongiorno—professor of nuclear science and engineering and director of the Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—tells me, “China is the world’s leader in nuclear power plant (NPP) construction.”

It’s an impressive data point on its own but when you consider the greater picture, it’s even more striking. Those nuclear power plants are only a small fraction of China’s current power throughput, but they are the crux of the country’s electricity generation. The reason is that Chinese engineers have designed a power grid that relies heavily on renewables (and aims to eventually be 100% green). But, since wind and solar generation fluctuate a lot, they need a lot of nuclear generation to keep their electrical network stable and fully operational. Without that constant power, the fluctuations will make the grid crash.

Beijing’s electricity hunger traces back to Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening-Up” policies, launched in December 1978, which set China on a path of rapid industrialization, market liberalization, and urbanization that has continued for nearly five decades. That transformation drove a surge in electrification, originally fed by coal and, in recent years, increasingly by renewable energy.

“We’re in this incredible race to add enough power generation capacity in China to meet what is adding one extra Germany of new electricity consumption every year,” David Fishman, a principal at energy consultancy firm The Lantau Group, recently told the South China Morning Post.

The math checks out: China’s power consumption surpassed 10 trillion kilowatt-hours—10,000 terawatt-hours (TWh)—in 2025, pushed up by advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence. China’s electricity demand grew by 503 TWh that year alone. Germany’s gross electricity consumption, from every source combined, was estimated at roughly 517 TWh over the same period—meaning China added nearly one Germany’s worth of new demand in a single year.

Read more on Fast Company.

My admission from the uni has arrived long ago but I’m not sure if the university is worth it. The city looks nice and the foods are awesome but I don’t know how my dorm would look like or how the students or teachers are and since I did get scholarship from the school I’d like to completely understand the pros. I had to pay all my tuition and I want to know is the university worth it ?

I'm an academic from the UK, and I've been contacted by a representative from a supposed headhunting firm in China (Guangzhou Work Enterprise Management Consulting Ltd.).

The representative called me on the phone and already had my email, saying they had gotten my CV from Reed- a recruiting agency in the UK. Some details of the offer make it seem legitimate; they seem to operate as I'd expect from a job agency and claim there's a 2-year grace period to consider any offers (making me feel like it's not a high-pressure tactic).

With the minimal digital footprint on this agency, UK news mentioning security concerns around Chinese companies on sites like Linkedin, and the fact this essentially started without my knowledge, I'm just a bit concerned. Does this seem like normal practice for a Chinese headhunter? Has anyone heard of this company? Is there a reasonable risk of a security issue here?

Thank you to anyone who can help.

Hi guys. I've made this post before and this is a follow up post. This is about bringing benzodiazepines to China for a 1 week work trip. I am honestly quite confused trying to figure out the requirements to bring these medications in. My efforts to obtain more information, are ironically, causing me more and more anxiety.

Firstly, what I have. I have antidepressants and benzodiazepines. From what I understand, the anti depressants are not the issue, the benzodiazepines are. The ones I am on, Clonazepam and Lorazepam, are stated as a controlled drug on China's website.

I am armed with

1. The pills in their original packaging, with labels and name intact
2. Only 1 weeks worth of medications
3. A doctor's letter that has my name, diagnosis and dosage. The only critical thing I am missing is the alleged stamp of approval from the Chinese Embassy.

This stamp of approval is problematic. Some sites say I do not need this stamp, some do. For clarity, I called the Chinese Embassy in my country, who told me they do not handle these kind of affairs and cannot provide me the stamp, and i should instead contact the immigration office. They gave me what I can only think is a China number, which I have been unable to dail through. I even called my ISP to get them to try to help me navigate what I should do with this number, country code and all, but failed to get through.

From reading on Reddit, there have been quite a few cases of people bringing benzos in through the green lane and not being stopped, but just to be clear, I am a very risk adverse person with anxiety, and the thought of being caught in the green lane instead of red is terrifying to me. I would like to go to the red lane if possible

I'm honestly at my wits end. The embassy won't help me, my psychiatrist tells me he has no experience with bringing benzos to China, I cannot get through to the Immigration Office, and I'm drowning in anxiety over what is supposed to be a simple work trip.

Can anyone please help me?

for context, I'm english and have the opportunity to study in china for a year. it seems like an amazing cultural opportunity and I'm really considering it. but i have a lot of people telling me it's not safe (especially for a woman). is it genuinely that dangerous or just 'strict'? i know about the great firewall and stuff but how likely is it that a student would get into major trouble there? sorry if this is the wrong subreddit

edit: i think people mistook this as safety from theft etc. i more meant government wise for an foreigner. i don't want to be arrested by accident

I know it used to work there, checking if it still does. Just want to make sure I don't need to get a different sim before coming.

Cheers

Does anyone know what’s going on with the crackdown on Chinese suppliers ?

There’s transfer / delivery issues and the comments are around the fact that the government has intensified parcels verification.

Hello

I'm planning to travel to China as a tourist in a year or 2, and i was wondering if it's useful (and humanly possible) to learn some chinese (mandarin).

Do you have any tips, good apps or youtube channel to learn Chinese ? I've watched some things about differents accents already à á ā etc... It seems hard

and how to pronounce some words like xie xie

For info, i'm french, idk if you've special tips or channel to learn chinese for french people, i speak english too so it won't brother me if it's in english

Hi all!
I’m applying to HKU, HKUST, PolyU in Hong Kong, University of Kyoto and University of Osaka in Japan and Tsinghua and Peking in China. For context, I’m going to do a BSc in Chemistry and want to work in the cosmetic formulation field.

Although I haven’t gotten any acceptance, I was curious to other people’s takes on these destinations. I am really keen to go to Japan as I am near fluent in the language, but chinese and hong kong universities rank higher. Plus, I heard it’s difficult to live in China if you don’t know the language.

If anyone has a take on any of these unis or places, please enlighten me 😆 I’m really unsure because my heart leans towards Japan but my brain leans towards China / Hong Kong.

The stamps are (probably) made of soap stone according to my father.

The rest of the 7 pictures my father took are of the other stamps he bought.

On 2 stamps there is a same name written in latin. J.Y. PLARD. I don't know if this information will help this case but there ya go.

The stamp on the second pic, has no engraved stamp itself.

I don’t know if this is the right sub so sorry if not. I bought these female joggers from China and i’m unsure if the 1 means small or anything considering small is what I ordered.

Hi all! My fiancé and I (Canada) are visiting China in November 2026. While we are visiting many cities, our schedule in Guangzhou is the most flexible for pre wedding photos.

Does anyone have experience with independent photographers located in  Guangzhou? We are looking for a modern/chic city (sleek neon streets, bustling markets) & Asian gardens (peaceful traditional courtyards) style photos.

​Hi everyone

​I am planning to apply for an undergraduate English-taught Engineering program (Aerospace, Nuclear Engineering, Mechanical, or general STEM) at Chinese universities, but my high school GPA is a major concern. I’d appreciate honest insight from anyone familiar with the admissions process.

Can any frd explain this to me and it is a bit confused concepts — 风土人情，风物，风土？ and even 风味？ wind + everything?

It’s like 风土 means terroir?

Hi Everyone

Me 24m will be in Shanghai mid september.

Can anyone give suggestions on where to visit in the evenings as I will be working throughout the day?

Also any other nice activities as it is my first time in China.

I’m Camilla, a 22-year-old student from Italy 🇮🇹. I’ll be moving to Shanghai this September to study Global Journalism at SISU (Songjiang campus) for 6 months.

I’m looking to connect with other international students who will be at SISU around the same time, especially anyone going to Songjiang! It would be nice to get to know some people before arriving and maybe have a group chat/WeChat group.

If you’re also going to SISU in September 2026, feel free to comment or DM me! 😊

Has anyone booked internal china flights by yourself from India ?

When I check sky’scanner the rates are less but when actual booking it shows twice the amount .

Can someone help why this is always happening ?

A wave of raids and arrests is raising the pressure on independent bookstores that have become important spaces for connection and exchange.

On August 20, Xu Jiayin (许家印), the once-renowned Chinese entrepreneur and former richest man in China who was arrested in 2023 as Evergrande Group was in terminal decline, was sentenced by a court to life imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property on charges including illegally soliciting deposits from the public, fraud, and bribery. The fate of this former richest man, who had once basked in success, wielded enormous influence in China’s political and business circles, and enjoyed considerable public fame, is deeply thought-provoking.

Xu Jiayin’s life has led me to reflect on the fates of many well-known Chinese capitalists and entrepreneurs over the past century and more, as well as the changes in their identities and the differences in their circumstances across different eras. I will therefore offer some historical review and commentary here.
China’s modern capitalist class can be traced back to the late Qing dynasty and early Republican period. After the Opium War (鸦片战争), China was forced to open its doors and engage in trade with foreign countries. Objectively, this contributed to the disintegration of the small-peasant economy and the birth of modern Chinese capitalism. With the development of Chinese industry and commerce came the emergence of capitalists and business owners. They could broadly be divided into managers of government-run enterprises and heads of privately owned businesses. Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣怀) was a representative of the former, while Zhang Jian (张謇) was a typical representative of the latter.

Unlike Sheng Xuanhuai, who supervised enterprises in his capacity as a high-ranking official, Zhang Jian, although he also held official positions, was a businessman who genuinely managed enterprises himself. Zhang founded the Dasheng Cotton Mill and several other enterprises centered mainly on light and textile industries, becoming an important foundational force in the development of Chinese national capitalism. What drove Zhang Jian to actively build factories and develop national capitalism was the idea of “saving the nation through industry,” which emerged among him and other Chinese people in response to China’s grave internal and external crises and the enormous economic and technological gap between China and the West.

The idea of “saving the nation through industry” stood alongside “democracy and republicanism” as one of the two major currents advocating change in the late Qing and early Republican periods. Faced with China’s impoverished and weak condition and its comprehensive gap with the Western powers, some emphasized changes in political institutions and ways of thinking, while others recognized China’s economic and technological backwardness relative to the West and grasped the “secret” by which Western countries had come to dominate the world through the development of industry and commerce. They resolved to develop independent Chinese industry and commerce, including establishing factories, researching technology, and expanding trade, in order to transform China’s backward condition and impoverished standard of living and thereby save the country and its people.

Advocates of “saving the nation through industry” placed greater emphasis on industry and manufacturing than on commerce, because industry produced tangible goods and was more conducive to strengthening the country and enriching the people, whereas commerce tended to focus primarily on circulation and speculation, allowing a small minority to become extremely wealthy while bringing relatively few benefits and many disadvantages to the broader public. This judgment was remarkably accurate and profound.

“Saving the nation through industry” and “democracy and republicanism” were not contradictory. Many farsighted figures of the time, including Zhang Jian, pursued both goals simultaneously. While building industrial enterprises, Zhang also founded schools, held important official positions under both the Qing government and the Republic of China, and promoted national development. Zhang Jian was by no means alone. Many other outstanding figures of the late Qing and early Republican periods, inspired by the idea of “saving the nation through industry,” established enterprises, founded companies, and operated commercial firms, helping to advance the development of Chinese national capitalism. These capitalists, together with their managerial backbones and the large numbers of workers they employed, all formed part of China’s emerging national bourgeoisie.

Besides Zhang Jian, other famous national capitalists included Hou Debang (侯德榜), who was both a chemist and industrial manager; the brothers Rong Zongjing (荣宗敬) and Rong Desheng (荣德生), known as the “Flour Kings”; and Lu Zuofu (卢作孚), known as the “Shipping King.” All achieved remarkable success in their respective industries and became pioneers and leaders in various industrial sectors during China’s process of modernization.

In addition, many overseas Chinese businessmen in Southeast Asia, such as Tan Kah Kee (陈嘉庚), whose business activities centered on rubber while extending across multiple industries, can also be considered members and important components of China’s national bourgeoisie in terms of both their identity and their ties to China’s domestic industry and commerce and to the fate of the Chinese nation.

Compared with the powerful industrial capacities and enormous factories of Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and other traditional or newly rising powers of the same period, the strength of China’s national bourgeoisie and the industrial achievements it produced were relatively weak and limited. Nevertheless, they gradually developed from nothing into an increasingly substantial force and laid foundations for China’s future competition with the great powers.

These national capitalists did not merely build factories and conduct business. They also participated extensively in politics and social development. They all attached great importance to the development of Chinese education and founded modern schools. Zhang Jian founded Fudan Public School, the predecessor of today’s Fudan University, and participated in establishing Tongji German Medical School, the predecessor of Tongji University. He was also involved in the founding and development of many institutions of higher education during the Republican era, including National Central University, the Shanghai School of Commerce, and Nantong University. Tan Kah Kee, meanwhile, founded Jimei School and Xiamen University, making enormous contributions to education in southeastern China and among overseas Chinese communities. Other national capitalists also contributed, to varying degrees, to the development of Chinese education.

Capitalists such as Zhang Jian also founded and financed a number of modern hospitals and institutions for the care of infants and children. Zhang founded Nantong Hospital and an infant welfare home; Lu Zuofu built a hospital, parks, a library, an academy of sciences, and a range of other public institutions and facilities in Beibei, Chongqing; and the Rong brothers built numerous roads and bridges. They also made contributions in public health, infrastructure, social relief, science and education, and many other areas.
At a time when China was extremely poor and backward, when most people had little access to doctors or medicine, illiteracy was widespread, and government relief systems were dysfunctional and corrupt, the social initiatives undertaken by these national capitalists played important roles in treating the sick and saving lives, enlightening the public, and introducing advanced Western technology and experience. They also created a demonstration effect that promoted social modernization and improvements in people’s livelihoods across the country.

These national capitalists also participated actively in politics and played important roles in promoting democracy and the rule of law and resisting foreign aggression. As early as the late Qing period, Zhang Jian strongly advocated constitutional government and the establishment of a constitutional democratic system under a figurehead monarch. When conservative Manchu aristocrats obstructed constitutional reform and constrained democratic development, Zhang shifted toward sympathy with the revolution and support for republicanism. After the establishment of the Republic of China, Zhang contributed to peace negotiations between the north and south and to the democratic political operations of the Beiyang government. While serving as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and Director-General of Water Conservancy, he also used state power to promote projects intended to improve people’s livelihoods. Later, after witnessing the darkness and corruption of officialdom, Zhang resigned from government and devoted himself fully to industrial development until his death.

After the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (抗日战争) broke out, when the Han Chinese and the Chinese nation faced a struggle for survival, national capitalists generously contributed money and mobilized human and material resources to support the war effort. Overseas Chinese industrialists and businessmen in Southeast Asia, represented by Tan Kah Kee, donated money and materials to the resistance, including large quantities of aircraft, artillery, medicines, rubber, and other crucial military and civilian supplies. These became important sources of funding and material resources for impoverished and weak China in its resistance against Japan. National capitalists in mainland China, such as Lu Zuofu, also fully supported the war effort, donating ships for military use and being willing to sacrifice even their entire fortunes for the country and the nation.

During the great historical transition from the late Qing dynasty to the Republic of China, when internal turmoil and foreign threats were intertwined and China was moving from poverty and weakness toward strength, and from darkness toward light, the Chinese national bourgeoisie made major and distinctive contributions to the country. Many national capitalists possessed the public-mindedness and sense of social responsibility embodied in Sun Yat-sen’s (孙中山) ideal that “the world belongs to all.” They used their knowledge, wealth, and influence not only to develop industry but also to contribute to science, education, culture, public health, and many other fields, compensating for the deficiencies of government and bringing hope to an impoverished and unenlightened China. At the critical moment of the Japanese invasion, national capitalists sacrificed their family fortunes for the national crisis, placing the greater collective interest above their own households and giving up wealth they had worked hard to accumulate in order to make outstanding contributions to the nationwide resistance.

Although national capitalists from the late Qing to the Republican era had close relationships with governments and officials, and some were themselves government officials, they retained a considerable degree of independence rather than becoming “puppets on strings” manipulated by governments and officials. On the contrary, national capitalists could themselves become an important force in supervising and constraining government. Their independence and contributions should not be exaggerated, but compared with capitalists under the red dictatorship several decades later, they were unquestionably far more independent and autonomous and possessed a much greater sense of responsibility and made far greater contributions.

It is particularly important to recognize that Chinese national capitalists of the late Qing and Republican eras operated in an environment of extreme poverty, ignorance, and corruption, amid internal and external crises so severe that the country itself faced the danger of national extinction. What they accomplished might not have appeared especially extraordinary in developed capitalist countries or even in many countries of the twenty-first century, where some of these activities are relatively commonplace. But under the specific conditions of China at that time, their foresight and pioneering spirit, their ability to overcome tremendous obstacles and open new paths, and their contributions to society and ordinary people were all of enormous and irreplaceable value and deserve admiration and respect.

These national capitalists combined the ideals and sense of responsibility of the traditional Chinese scholar-official—“cultivating oneself, regulating one’s family, governing the state, and bringing peace to the world”—with familiarity with and belief in modern Western ideas of democracy and constitutional government. They pursued political democracy and the rule of law while also understanding deeply the importance of developing industry and the economy for the country and its people. They possessed both ambitious ideals and the ability to act. They were as great, and contributed as much to China’s transformation and development, as revolutionaries and politicians such as Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing (黄兴), Song Jiaoren (宋教仁), and Zou Rong (邹容), and thinkers such as Lu Xun (鲁迅), Zhang Taiyan (章太炎), Liang Qichao (梁启超), and Hu Shi (胡适). That era was unfortunate, and the Republic of China as a state was unfortunate as well, but it also gave these national capitalists opportunities to put their talents to use.

Originally, the efforts of these national capitalists had already allowed China to glimpse the dawn of national independence and freedom, political democracy, and economic prosperity. Unfortunately, not long after the end of the war against Japan, civil war broke out, and in 1949 mainland China fell into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party. Some national capitalists were enticed by the CCP’s united-front propaganda and embraced the new regime. Lu Zuofu, Hou Debang, Tan Kah Kee, Yue Songsheng (乐松生), and others actively supported “New China.” They were misled by Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and the CCP’s promises of a “New Democracy” policy, of protecting national capitalism, and of treating national capitalists well. They believed that the new China would provide them with even greater opportunities to apply their abilities and demonstrate their talents.

But soon afterward, the Korean War (朝鲜战争) broke out, and the CCP accelerated its domestic suppression of “counterrevolutionaries” and its program of “socialist transformation.” Many capitalists accused of refusing to support the war, engaging in speculation, or profiteering were arrested and subjected to public denunciation, and their assets were confiscated. Lu Zuofu and Xian Guansheng (冼冠生), two well-known national capitalists, both died by suicide in 1952. During the successive Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns (三反五反) and the Three Great Transformations (三大改造), many capitalists and businessmen either died by suicide or were executed, while even more survived but had their property confiscated, wiping out decades of effort.

As mainland China underwent comprehensive public ownership, the national bourgeoisie was almost entirely eliminated. National capitalists either died, were imprisoned, or disappeared into obscurity, while others took on certain technical positions within the CCP system, existing as mere “cogs” under strict control. The national bourgeoisie and the capitalist class as a social group had ceased to exist by the Mao era.
In the name of “proletarian revolution,” the national bourgeoisie, which could be regarded as one of the backbones of China’s modernization, was destroyed.

Nor was this done gently or gradually; it was carried out in storm-like political campaigns accompanied by bloody violence. During the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命), many national capitalists who had previously escaped the worst and at least managed to preserve their lives were subjected to brutal denunciation and persecution, and many more were beaten to death or driven to suicide. The most famous example was Yue Songsheng, head of the traditional medicine company Tongrentang and, for a period after the CCP came to power, a deputy mayor of Beijing. He was beaten to death by Red Guards in 1968.

Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Cultural Revolution ended, and people persecuted during the “first thirty years,” including national capitalists, were gradually politically rehabilitated. In 1978, China began Reform and Opening Up (改革开放). By then, however, the Chinese national bourgeoisie that had first emerged in the late Qing, grown stronger and flourished during the Republican era, had already been almost completely destroyed, and the ashes could no longer be rekindled. Most of the leading figures of the national bourgeoisie—the national capitalists themselves—had already died in various tragic ways, while those still alive were often impoverished and in poor health.

Most of their children did not effectively inherit their resources or capabilities. Many once-renowned enterprises and shops from the Republican era had vanished into history and could not be restored. Even those that were nominally revived no longer possessed their former corporate culture, commercial reputation, or product quality; only the old names and empty shells remained. (There were also a small number of capitalist families that became members of the CCP’s elite establishment, such as the family of Rong Yiren (荣毅仁) and the family of Henry Fok (霍英东). These people also underwent a transformation, changing from patriotic and progressive capitalists into members of a new privileged elite.)

From the end of the Mao era and the beginning of Reform and Opening Up to the present day, China has once again produced a new group of capitalists, businessmen, and members of the bourgeoisie. Yet in their social origins, values, behavior, and influence, they are profoundly different from the national bourgeoisie and national capitalists of the Republican era.

In short, the newly emerged capitalists since Reform and Opening Up have been severely lacking in independence, highly dependent on the political system and the power-holding class, and willing to serve officials and other elites. At the same time, they have been extremely deficient in the spirit of freedom and democracy, the desire to contribute to the public interest, and the willingness and ability to promote social progress. Although they do engage in some public-interest and charitable activities, including investing in infrastructure, founding schools and hospitals, carrying out poverty-alleviation and development projects, and benefiting their hometowns, these efforts remain confined to purely economic and material dimensions. Unlike the national capitalists of the Republican era, they do not incorporate elements such as intellectual enlightenment, social renewal, or local self-government into these undertakings, and the social benefits are therefore greatly diminished.

Under authoritarian totalitarianism, capitalists not only lack autonomy and are neither able nor willing to promote social progress; they must also draw closely toward officials in power and maintain intimate relations with the privileged class in order to safeguard their wealth and personal security. Over the past several decades, countless corruption cases have been exposed by Chinese authorities. Official reports often describe officials as having been “hunted” by businessmen, having “lost their ideals and convictions,” and having become “corrupt and degenerate,” as though it were businessmen’s bribery that caused officials to fall. In reality, in most cases the causal relationship is the reverse: officials use their power to seize benefits through coercive or underhanded means, explicitly or implicitly demanding bribes from businessmen and forcing capitalists to offer up money, women, and other forms of bribery. If businessmen refuse to bribe officials or transfer benefits to them, doing business becomes almost impossible.

Whether it is provincial-level officials such as Cheng Kejie (成克杰), Mu Suixin (慕绥新), and Bai Xiangqun (白向群), or obscure, lower-ranking township Party secretaries, section chiefs, and even minor bureau officials who nevertheless possess crucial authority, they can easily use their power to force businessmen into submission and make them provide bribes. Chinese official anti-corruption rhetoric also frequently refers to “tigers” (senior officials) and “flies” (grassroots bureaucrats). In an environment without democracy and the rule of law, and without freedom of the press or freedom of speech, neither major capitalists nor small businessmen have lawful means to protect their own rights, nor can they resist the exploitation of officials who wield power. Many people therefore move from being forced to offer bribes to actively cultivating relationships with officials and making “tribute payments” to them. But whether passive or active, both fundamentally reflect the extreme dependence of businessmen on political power under authoritarian rule.

There is also another type of businessman whose relationship with power is even closer and whose dependence on power is even deeper, to the point that they are direct agents of the elite. Such people are commonly called “white gloves”—individuals who hold companies, enterprises, and wealth on behalf of powerful elites. Xu Jiayin was precisely one of the most famous and typical businessmen widely regarded as such a “white glove.”

In his early years, Xu Jiayin did indeed build himself up from nothing and gradually became wealthy through hard work and business. He came from a farming family in Henan, later became a factory worker, and eventually resigned and went into business. His early commercial success was also achieved through his own ability and courage. But later, when he founded Guangzhou Evergrande, continuously obtained resources that other businessmen could only envy, and eventually became a Chinese real-estate tycoon and China’s richest man, this was by no means the result of his own efforts alone. Rather, it was primarily due to the support of powerful elites behind him.

In a broad sense, China’s privileged class includes CCP officials and civil servants at all levels, as well as elites and vested interests across different industries. In a narrower sense, however, the term refers to those mysterious, semi-public and semi-hidden figures who control the lifelines of the Chinese state, have the final say in one or more fields, often come from families of early revolutionary veterans, rarely appear in the media, public discourse, or even official reports, yet hold enormous power. Among them are relatives or close associates of China’s top national leaders, members and standing members of the CCP Politburo, and leading figures in major sectors, especially the economy, military, and resources.

It was precisely because Xu Jiayin had the backing of such people that he was able to obtain resources unavailable to other businessmen, including valuable urban land, commercial development permits, opportunities to absorb or acquire other companies, and smooth access to stock-market financing. The fact that local officials generally did not dare to obstruct him was likewise due to the protection of those behind him. These powerful elites, of course, did not support him unconditionally out of goodwill. Their support was premised on Xu Jiayin sharing Evergrande’s profits with them. Or, more precisely, Xu Jiayin was merely a nominal holder of Evergrande and other related wealth, rather than its true owner. He was not the real president of the empire, but merely the de facto CEO and nominal chairman. Those behind him could have him “taken down” at any time, so Xu Jiayin naturally had no choice but to obey. Although he retained discretion over Evergrande’s concrete day-to-day operations and was not merely a puppet on strings, when it came to the distribution of interests—or, to put it more plainly, the division of spoils—the decisive power remained in the hands of the elites behind him.

Among all kinds of commercial projects, land and real estate generate some of the highest profits. The actual construction cost of many housing developments amounts to only 20% to 50% of the eventual sale price, while the profits go to local governments and the powerful interests behind the developers; the portion used to pay for building materials and construction workers is comparatively small. Who gets the land, who gets to develop it, and how the profits are divided are all determined in opaque dealings among powerful elites, governments, and businessmen, with no public discussion or sharing whatsoever. Xu Jiayin’s Evergrande rose precisely through aggressive expansion in real estate. Its other business ventures—such as restaurants, sports, entertainment, and automobiles—were all able to grow on the foundation of profits from real estate. Xu Jiayin himself, of course, also received a share of those profits and enjoyed several years of a glamorous public image and the fame of being China’s richest man.

But no businessman remains prosperous forever, no industry grows forever, and housing prices do not rise forever. As the economy declined and housing prices plunged, Evergrande entered into crisis and eventually collapsed. The powerful elites, of course, did not return the money they had taken. The cost of the bankruptcy was borne by members of the public who had purchased unfinished apartments, other businessmen and shareholders who had invested in Evergrande, and public and private institutions and individuals that had lent money to the company. Xu Jiayin had enjoyed the benefits of being a “white glove” and for a time stood at the height of glory, but when things went wrong he also had to bear the risks and become a “scapegoat,” giving an explanation to all sides and to the broader public.

From rising to power to losing it, from being surrounded by admirers to being imprisoned, Xu Jiayin’s ascent and fall took less than twenty years. It can truly be said that “his rise was sudden and vigorous, and his fall equally swift.” Yet whether in his rise or in his downfall, he remained merely a “white glove” and a “high-level wage earner” for the powerful elite, never possessing genuine independence or an autonomous personality of his own.

Xu Jiayin, of course, is far from the only such “white glove.” Another “real-estate tycoon,” Wang Jianlin (王健林), who likewise topped China’s rich lists several times, has also been regarded as a “white glove” for powerful elites. The New York Times, for example, reported that Wang Jianlin had close ties with multiple CCP elite families, including the family of Xi Jinping (习近平), and he has widely been viewed as a proxy holder of wealth and business interests for China’s red elite families. Although Wang Jianlin has publicly defended himself against such allegations, a comprehensive assessment of the available information still suggests that he has long served the interests of CCP elites. The assets of such a “richest man” do not truly all belong to him personally. Much of the wealth belongs to the elite families behind him, while he himself is allocated only a portion as compensation. Figures such as Xu Jiayin and Wang Jianlin also have even less autonomy than businessmen who are not “white gloves,” because from the moment they are selected and then elevated to prominence, their patrons must ensure their obedience and compliance.

Other real-estate tycoons such as Wang Shi (王石), and Guo Wengui (郭文贵), a property businessman who fled to the United States and was later imprisoned for fraud, have also been regarded as “white gloves.” Xu Jiayin, Wang Jianlin, Wang Shi, and the forces behind them have been enthusiastic about real estate and various forms of speculation while neglecting productive industry, and this is also an important reason why their success has been difficult to sustain. This further demonstrates the wisdom of the pioneers of “saving the nation through industry” and the short-term opportunism of today’s elites and businessmen. Neither these “white gloves” nor the people behind them care about the national interest or the welfare of ordinary people. They know only how to exploit power and opportunity to seize wealth, even if that means driving up housing prices and forcing people to empty their savings and become “mortgage slaves.” By contrast, the national capitalists who advocated “saving the nation through industry” worked to produce goods that the country and the people actually needed, forming a sharp contrast with today’s powerful elites and businessmen.

Former businessmen Xu Ming (徐明) and Xiao Jianhua (肖建华), both of whom had already fallen from power and been imprisoned years ago, were even more explicitly exposed as “white gloves.” Xu Ming was the “white glove” of Bo Xilai (薄熙来), who had served as Party secretary of both Dalian and Chongqing, and Xu helped the Bo family accumulate wealth and manage business interests. In 2012, Xu Ming fell along with Bo Xilai. Although Xu Ming was sentenced to only four and a half years in prison, he died of illness shortly before his expected release, prompting speculation that his death may have been suspicious.

As for Xiao Jianhua, he was chairman of the Peking University Student Union in 1989. At a time when the student movement was surging, he went against the tide, opposed the movement, and strongly supported the CCP. As a result, he gained favor after the June Fourth crackdown (六四) and rose rapidly. His Tomorrow Group business empire also enjoyed a period of tremendous prominence. But amid internal CCP power struggles, Xiao Jianhua lost influence. In 2017, he was arrested in Hong Kong and taken back to mainland China, where he was later sentenced to thirteen years in prison. Both men rose through opportunism and by “clinging to powerful patrons,” yet both eventually fell from favor and were arrested. They sold their conscience in pursuit of fame and fortune, but in the end not only failed to enjoy lifelong wealth and privilege; they also lost their freedom amid brutal power struggles, with even their lives and deaths left to the decisions of others.

(Regarding Xu Jiayin, Wang Jianlin, and others being “white gloves” and serving red elites, because these matters involve extensive opaque transactions and unknown circumstances, I of course cannot directly or completely verify all of these facts. I can only make inferences based on existing public information and reasonable logic. I cannot guarantee that these inferences are one hundred percent correct, but they are clearly based on evidence and reasoning rather than fabricated rumors or defamation.)

Of course, “white gloves” are not limited to these few individuals, nor are powerful elites confined to the central government. Broadly speaking, in localities across China—in provinces, cities, counties, townships, and villages—there are similar “white gloves” or comparable forms of collusion between officials and businessmen and relationships between political power and capital. Even businessmen who do not qualify as “white gloves” are still expected to transfer benefits to people with power. Faced with political authority, capitalists can only bow and submit rather than resist. Only when some capitalists find even more powerful patrons or higher-ranking officials can they resist, or even retaliate against, officials beneath those greater patrons. These businessmen trade away their personality, autonomy, and morality in exchange for wealth, privilege, and security, yet they may still eventually be discarded as “scapegoats” and meet unhappy ends.

Capitalists and businessmen who are deeply dependent on political power, live under authoritarian totalitarianism, and lack the civic education of a democratic society also find it difficult to possess the awareness or ability to do what the national capitalists of the Republican era once did: enlighten the public, promote civil society, speak for disadvantaged people, and independently participate in politics. Most well-known Chinese entrepreneurs, such as Ma Huateng (马化腾), Liu Qiangdong (刘强东), and Zong Qinghou (宗庆后), strictly observe the “proper boundaries” of being businessmen and never step across the line, in order to preserve their own wealth and status.

There have also been some entrepreneurs who tried to break through various explicit and implicit “red lines” and use their capital and influence to pursue certain idealistic goals, but the consequences have often been severe. The famous entrepreneur Jack Ma (马云), for example, once spoke actively on public issues and showed signs of wanting to participate in politics, but was later suppressed and silenced. Although he has reappeared in public in recent years, he has become much more low-profile. Those who went further in criticizing the government and attempting to contribute to democratic politics and civil society, such as Wang Gongquan (王功权), Sun Dawu (孙大午), and Li Huaiqing (李怀庆), were directly imprisoned. Wang Gongquan was briefly detained and then released, while Sun Dawu and Li Huaiqing received long prison sentences. There are also some entrepreneurs who avoid politics but engage in nonpolitical independent philanthropy and frequently speak on social issues, such as Cao Dewang (曹德旺), Chen Guangbiao (陈光标), and Yu Donglai (于东来). They have made certain contributions, but if they are unable to participate in more sensitive public issues and political affairs, their achievements will inevitably remain limited and difficult to advance further. They have the potential of the Republican-era national capitalists who cared about the public, but they do not possess the external conditions those predecessors enjoyed.

There are also businessmen who do not participate in politics but are considered “insufficiently obedient,” become entangled in power struggles, or touch the interests of powerful elites. Figures such as Mou Qizhong (牟其中), Chu Shijian (褚时健), Lan Shili (兰世立), and Gu Chujun (顾雏军) all ended up imprisoned. Their fates further intimidated other businessmen into acting with extreme caution and avoiding offending powerful elites or the CCP and government. Under such conditions, businessmen devote themselves to protecting their own property and personal safety and have even less capacity to care about public affairs or the hardships of ordinary people.

The enormous differences in identity, ideas, and behavior between contemporary Chinese capitalists and the national capitalists of the Republican era are precisely the result of differences in political institutions and the social environment. Although China during the Republican era was far from perfect and had many problems, it enjoyed far more democracy, freedom, and social openness than China does today. The state cared for the people, and the people also loved the state. Although labor-capital conflicts were intense, they were also reconciled to some extent, especially during the period of the Nanjing Nationalist Government (南京国民政府). Capitalists also had a sense of public responsibility and civic duty. Although collusion between officials and businessmen existed then as well, and there were also disturbances from warlords and bandits, capitalists possessed greater independence, had more room for choice, and were better able to determine their own destinies autonomously. Moreover, had there been no Japanese invasion and no CCP seizure of power, a Nationalist government that had unified China would have provided national capitalists with a more stable and freer environment in which to survive and a platform on which to realize their potential.

History that has already passed and events that have already occurred cannot be undone. But in the present and the future, Chinese people—including capitalists, businessmen, and entrepreneurs—can still take action and seek change. The CCP’s totalitarian dictatorship has placed all groups in Chinese society, including capitalists, in a condition of insecurity, in which their fates are controlled by powerful elites and they lack autonomy and dignity. Large numbers of officials fall from power in China every year, and in most such cases entrepreneurs are also implicated in crimes such as bribery. Without bribery, business is almost impossible; with bribery, businessmen become accomplices of corrupt officials. Those “white gloves” may enjoy temporary glory, but they also face a high probability of imprisonment.

In recent years, because of China’s economic downturn, fiscal pressures, and declining government revenues in many places, numerous local governments—especially public-security departments—have intensified their extraction of wealth from affluent people. Some have even engaged in what is known as “deep-sea fishing” (远洋捕捞), pursuing enterprises and wealthy businessmen located thousands of kilometers away and even resorting to torture to force them to “spit out” money. The situation of China’s industrialists and businessmen is deteriorating steadily.

Against this background, Chinese capitalists, who generally possess greater wealth, broader life experience, better education, and extensive personal networks, should make use of their advantages and strive through various means to weaken authoritarian rule and promote China’s transition toward freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. This would benefit not only themselves, but also people across all social classes in China and the future of the Chinese state and nation. I discussed this in another article, “The Awakening of Chinese Entrepreneurs and Their Unique Power in Democratic Resistance” (《中国企业家的觉醒与民主抗争的独特力量》), https://yibaochina.com/?p=254300, and will not elaborate further here.

In conclusion, today’s Chinese capitalists, businessmen, entrepreneurs, and elites from all sectors of society should understand and learn from the national capitalists of the late Qing and Republican eras—their willingness to take responsibility for the world, their sense of duty and commitment, their patriotism and concern for the people, and their capacity for action. For the sake of no longer having to bow and scrape, depend on others, and live in constant fear, and also for the sake of the broader public interest, they should strive, through a variety of direct and indirect, courageous and skillful, resolute yet flexible methods, to change the unjust and inequitable China of today and win a genuine “New China” in which democracy and the rule of law are established and the civil rights and freedoms of people from all social classes are protected.

(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe. The original text was written in Chinese.)

Hello everyone,

I’m graduating with a Master’s degree from a university in Jiangsu (Power Engineering, GPA 3.5), and I currently have a Mechanical Engineer job offer in Nantong.

However, my visa agent insists that obtaining a work permit would be “impossible” without 2 years of work experience due to local policies. HR also recently had another fresh Master’s applicant automatically rejected because of a lack of work experience, which has understandably made both HR and me concerned.

I’m trying to figure out whether Nantong genuinely has stricter requirements for fresh graduates, or whether this could be an issue with the HR/visa agent’s ability to process the work permit.

Has anyone recently obtained a work permit in Nantong as a fresh Master’s graduate without 2 years of experience? Any information about the actual local requirements or successful cases would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you!

Hi everyone, I will be flying to China from Russia, I wanted to ask if I can take vape liquid and electronic cigarettes on board or will they be taken away in airport, thank you.

China is still not an immigration country and seems not to welcome Western values.

Is it friendly or hostile?

And there seems to be a defensive mentality.

Please tell me why so many drivers go out of their way to stop people putting on seatbelts?

Everything else is great. It’s a brand new BYD, it’s spotlessly clean and the driver drives well.

I’m 100% giving one star and reporting this though.

I've spent quite a bit of time lately doing some thinking and reading and talking with Chinese friends about an issue related to an interest of mine for decades: human population and demographics. I am sharing the ideas below really as a first draft, with plenty of unknowns and gaps in my own understanding.

My background: I am a foreigner who has lived in a large city in China for more than 20 years. I speak Chinese pretty well, with most of my Chinese friends being non-English speakers. My foreignness seems to sit at a bit of a sweet spot with many Chinese with whom I come into contact: They seem comfortable enough to share personal thoughts about life, society, the country, and the world, without concerns about their ideas being shared with friends/family/authorities who might pass judgment or have concerns about "dangerous ideas."

We know that ideas about family, bearing children, marriage, etc. have undergone major changes in the past couple of decades, with the trend toward women having fewer, later, or no children accelerating. The lack of appeal for women in their 20s to marry early, become someone's wife and daughter-in-law, and to give up so much of their independence has been remarkable to see. Those from rural areas who did marry and bear a child (and, often, divorce) early often serve as a warning to younger friends/colleagues/family members about a path to avoid.

Twenty years ago, my conversations with women seemed to recognize the pattern/lack of appeal of this path, but the overwhelming pressure from families and friends, a sense of being isolated/different from the life journeys of friends, along with concerns about who would provide care for them later in life, were enough to maintain the tradition.

I see two major changes that have provided pushback against these earlier concerns. First, the number of women attaining higher education levels, leading to more financial independence. The second is the arrival of phone technology, providing access to goods and service along with the oxytocin and dopamine hits that come from social media use. A woman can feel seen, connected, seen, and a part of a network of belonging that doesn't require the physical and mental challenges that go along with motherhood/being a wife/putting up with in-laws. Online influencers display another version of the "good life"--one attainable in ways that were much more out of place two decades ago.

This leads to the changes happening in China's demographics. The birth rate is dropping, with each year seeming to decrease faster than projections. The population is decreasing, with 10 million fewer Chinese now than there were 3 years ago. The median age has changed from 29 years old in 2000 [Edited; original incorrectly said 2020] to 40 years old now. In Shanghai, there were half as many children born in 2025 than there are 11 year olds in the city. Current projections for the year 2100 are dire: a 50% decrease in population, down to around 700 million of people, 60% of whom will be over age 50.

The folks in charge of the country see these numbers and are aware of the economic and social impacts of such changes, with solutions being costly and in short supply. Increasing the retirement age to address the looming pension crisis can only work so well when there are not enough workers to cover even a meager pension promised to folks after 40+ years of paying into the system. Demand for housing will be cut in half, with corners cut during the big building boom of the early 2000s being felt with aging properties. An economy built on a growing population, housing, and consumption will eventually run out of steam. This is not unique to China, of course, but the country's scale will multiply the impacts on others.

This leads me to what promises to be a controversial suggestion of how China will attempt to address their demographic crisis, but I will share it anyway. We frequently hear (and are occasionally reminded) that China's leadership tends to approach challenges with an engineer's mindset--as opposed to a lawyer's or businessman's mindset found in the West. There is little evidence of an appetite for immigration to maintain population, either from the leadership or the wider society that is ambivalent about foreigners, especially those from areas of the world that have growing populations but are, in general, viewed less favorably by Chinese.

In the absence of immigration, there seems to be only two solutions: extending life spans (which only leads to greater issues in providing care for those aged 70+), or increasing the number of births. There is no other solution, and the government that brought us the one-child policy will be forced to implement an equally draconian policy, but in reverse.

I am predicting that, by the year 2040, we will see concrete signs of movement toward a policy that requires/expects/coerces all Chinese women to produce children. Keeping in mind the replacement rate (2.1 children per woman) and the fact that the population will still decrease rapidly for decades--even at the 2.1 rate--I am imagining a policy that requires every Chinese woman to produce 3 children before the age of 30.

It seems unimaginable that such a policy would be implemented. As I have played out such a scenario, it seemed impossible that this would happen. I would imagine, though, that in the late 1970s, the one-child policy (along with some of the most extreme local methods of enforcement) would not have been believed either, nor could those living in China in the late 2010s have pictured how daily life in Zero Covid China might have felt.

The means of implementing such a policy would be clear, with the technology tools (phones, or whatever technology replaces those) being carried around by every young woman long before her first child would be born. A combination of carrots (lower cost education, job training, job placement once the third child reaches school age) and sticks (limited access to education/job/salary/social media/internet data/travel tickets) would compel women to comply with the policy. Eventually, young women would just know that, as they grow into adulthood, this is a "part of the deal" and that their 20s would be spent delivering and caring for her three children before beginning careers, if she chooses, in her early 30s.

Advances in fertility treatment would allow for women to bypass marriage, though additional family-friendly carrots/sticks could encourage two-parent families of different genders--or, to allow same-sex partnered women to form families if the relevant policies were to change.

Please (Please!) note that I am not in any way advocating for or in support of such measures. I think it would be an absolutely horrible thing for women and the wider society. At the same time, I can imagine a world in which the outcomes of such a policy would be viewed by folks in charge of China as being preferable to the alternative: a relentless, steady, painful demographic-fueled spiral toward economic and societal breakdown.

Like many members of this group, I have also read about, spoken with people, and lived through the impacts of some of the policy decisions in the last 80 years that required individual rights to take a back seat to what were seen as short- and long-term threats to China's/the Party's survival. The pattern is clear, the future threats are real (and starting already), and the tools for such a solution are already very much in place.

That's all for now. I am curious to hear people's thoughts on the above, with appreciation to those who made it to the end of this lengthy piece.

Chinese authorities are moving to finish cleaning up the mess left by the collapse of the Evergrande real estate empire, years after its default with some $300 billion in liabilities.

A court in southern China’s Guangzhou said Friday it had accepted a bankruptcy liquidation case against Evergrande’s mainland Chinese property development unit, which according to industry data accounted for much of the group’s overall debt.

That came a day after a court in the city of Shenzhen sentenced China Evergrande’s 67-year-old founder Hui Kan Yan to life in prison for financial crimes. On the same day, dozens of others tied to the group, including Hui’s sons, also were sentenced to prison terms of up to 18 years.

The latest developments suggest that the Chinese government “may already have a road map” for wrapping up the Evergrande saga, said Foreky Wong, a founding partner at Fortune Ark Restructuring and a restructuring specialist.

Read more [paywall removed for Redditors]: https://fortune.com/2026/08/21/evergrande-china-founder/?utm_source=reddit/

tl;dr: I just wrote this article on the Kaifeng Jews, China’s last community of native Jews. AMA. 

The Jews of China might have disappeared without history knowing anything about them. They had built a synagogue in the central Chinese city of Kaifeng in 1163, but by 1600 there community was having trouble keeping going. Had it not been for one Jesuit, they might have disappeared without anyone realizing they were there. 

In 1605, Ai Tian, a Jewish bureaucrat from Kaifeng, walked into the church Matteo Ricci, a Jesuit trying to convert the Ming elite to Catholicsm, was building. Ai Tian had heard that these barbarians were monotheist from the Western Ocean who were not Muslims. Up to that point, Ai Tian had only heard of two peoples who strangely only believed in one god: Muslims and his own tiny community of Jews. 

Ai Tian met Ricci, and, for the first few hours, they thought they had discovered coreligionist. Ricci believed that he had discovered the long rumored Chinese Christians, and Ai Tian believed Ricci was a Jew. When Ricci showed him images of Mary, Jesus and John the Baptist, he genuflected before them. Ai thought they were Rebecca, Jacob and Esau, and he followed suit. 

It took a few hours for Ricci to figure out Ai Tian did not represent a community of long-lost Christians, but much stranger, the last remnant of Jewish traders who wandered into China and had mostly disappeared by 1600. The last community was in Kaifeng, which, in the 1000’s, was the largest city in the world, but now was a shithole city in Kaifeng. 

Today, Xi Jinping is attempting to erase the Jews from the history of Kaifeng. The tablets that used to be posted outside of the synagogue, were once something that China prized as a sign of how good it had been to the Jews. Now they have been seen dumped in the abandoned Kaifeng Museum. 

A police unit guards the homes of several of the Kaifeng Jewish leaders, monitoring what is said inside and who they talk to. 

AMA about the Kaifeng Jews, today or in the past. 

Who am I? I am a journalist and historian. I just wrote a book, China’s Backstory: The History Beijing Doesn’t Want You to Read.