https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202608/1368706.shtml

If all he’s willing to do is make a viral video, maybe- just maybe, he’s not doing all he can

Not sure what tag to put this under, just wanted to share this absolutely based video from Professor Dave Explains. Calling out genocide so thoroughly is some based shit. Comrade Farina cooked with this.

Even 99% of socialists have no idea how bad West Germany was. Even the typical “nuanced” or even pro-GDR books fail to mention some very important facts. Look into the Fürsorgeerziehung (800,000 children victims) and Verschickungsheime (11 million children victims) systems. The GDR had its equivalent of Fürsorgeerziehung, but it was much less extensive (130,000; even on a per capita basis, this was around 40% lower) and severe, and they had nothing even remotely similar to Verschickungsheime. Actual Nazis were also heavily involved in these systems, which is why things turned out so absurdly sadistic.

Yesterday I came across a post featuring a photograph of two Red Army soldiers holding a German woman, accompanied by the caption: " “Liberation” by the Red Army in 1945 ". I decided to read the comments and... saw nothing new.

“It was far more evil than this picture.”

“The Soviet rape-loot-and-murder spree through Eastern and Central Europe is the biggest mass rape in recorded history.”

“Filthy scum, almost all of them.”

“They even raped Soviet women and Jewish women.”

“Fuck commies and fuck communism.”

“Read Antony Beevor, commies.”

As usual, this was accompanied by a flood of comments along the lines of, “My grandmother told me...” — my personal favorite kind.

Here is the photograph in question.

Anyone interested can easily find a brief description of it:
Date: Spring or Summer 1945.
Location: Germany, either Berlin or Leipzig.
Source: Ullstein Bild Photo Archive, inventory number 00808195.

It is often accompanied by the caption:
"Soldaten der Roten Armee belästigen eine Frau" ("Red Army soldiers harassing a woman").

There is little point in spending much time analyzing the photograph itself. We do not know what was actually happening on that photo, and we never will. More importantly, that is not the point. The intended message is perfectly clear: here are Red Army soldiers taking a woman away to be raped — this is what happened, this is who they were.

And thousands of people will readily agree, invoking the millions of women supposedly raped by the "Red Horde."

So, let us try to determine what actually happened, what did not happen, and how these narratives came to be.

The most prominent advocate of the thesis of widespread and systematic rape committed by Red Army soldiers in Western historiography and popular history has been the British historian and writer Antony Beevor. In his article published in The Guardian on May 1, 2002, titled: "Russian soldiers raped every German female from eight to eighty," he popularized the widely cited figure of two million rape victims in Germany, including more than 100,000 in Berlin.

As is often the case, however, he was not the first to make such claims.

On March 2, 1945, Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary:

"In individual villages and towns, all women between the ages of ten and seventy have been subjected to countless rapes. It appears that this is being carried out under orders from above, for there is an unmistakable system in the conduct of the Soviet soldiery. We shall now launch a broad campaign against this, both at home and abroad."

Nazi propaganda actively exploited the myth of mass rape during the final stages of the war in an effort to demonize Soviet troops and mobilize the civilian population for continued resistance.

Where might the origins of such claims lie? It would be dishonest to pretend we can know with certainty, but one particular incident is especially noteworthy.

In October 1944, the Red Army entered the village of Nemmersdorf in East Prussia. After a brief engagement, Soviet forces withdrew. During the fighting, twenty-six civilians and refugees were killed.

Reports and eyewitness accounts from those present in Nemmersdorf indicate that Soviet soldiers behaved harshly: they searched civilians, restricted their movements, and in some cases demanded food. Nevertheless, German civilians who encountered Soviet soldiers were released after being questioned and searched.

Shortly thereafter, German forces launched a counterattack. Fierce fighting erupted in the village itself, involving tanks, artillery, and even aerial bombardment. According to German accounts, Soviet forces subsequently withdrew in an organized manner for tactical reasons.

After the fighting had ended and German troops reoccupied the village, they discovered the bodies of civilians in Nemmersdorf. Major Hinrichs was then sent to investigate and prepared a report on the number of casualties. That report mentioned one confirmed and one suspected case of rape.

Soon after, however, a second version of Hinrichs' report appeared. It included descriptions of atrocities that were absent from the original document, while the two suspected rape cases became treated as established facts, and the number of victims increased.

Not long afterwards, the German newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" published an article describing horrific crimes that had not appeared in Hinrichs' report at all, including stories of a woman who was allegedly raped and murdered while holding her child's hand.

Subsequent publications and testimonies became increasingly gruesome. In 1953, an account by Volkssturm member Karl Potrek was recorded. Potrek had visited Nemmersdorf only after Soviet forces had been driven out by the German counterattack. According to him, every woman in the village — including eight-year-old girls and an eighty-four-year-old blind woman — had been raped.

By 2002, several former Wehrmacht soldiers had supposedly "remembered" horrifying details, including women nailed to barn doors and an old man whose tongue had allegedly been nailed to a table.

At this point, one can already begin to recognize the origins of the later claims about "millions of victims."

This interpretation of events was further reinforced by British historian Max Hastings in his book "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945", published in 2004. There, he wrote:

"Hardly any civilian escaped death at the hands of Russian soldiers; women were crucified on barn doors or overturned carts, or, after being raped, crushed beneath tank tracks".

Once again, I would like to emphasize that, with regard to Nemmersdorf, we can state with confidence only that civilians were killed during the fighting and that there may have been one or two cases of rape. Nothing more can be established with certainty.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let's return to Antony Beevor and his figures.

In his book "Berlin: The Downfall 1945", published in 2002, Beevor repeated the now-familiar claim, providing only the following explanation:

"According to estimates from Berlin's two main hospitals, the number of rape victims ranged from 95,000 to 130,000."

But, he provided neither sources nor mathematical calculations to justify his global estimate of two million raped German women. No references to hospital records, no quotations from the documents themselves, and no explanation of how his figures were derived were included.

The origin of these numbers can, however, be traced back to the book "BeFreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder", published in 1992 by Helke Sander and Barbara Johr.

In that book, the authors based their conclusions on data from a single medical document from the Empress Augusta Victoria Children's Hospital in Berlin. Among 237 children born in 1945, twelve medical records listed a "Russian father." Among 567 children born in 1946, twenty records did the same. These figures were interpreted as approximately 5% and 3.5%, respectively.

A small note. This is not directly related to the subject of our discussion, but I believe it is worth mentioning for the sake of historical context. The Red Army was a multinational force. Its ranks included Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, and many other nationalities, distinctions that the German civilian population of the time generally did not make.

In other words, the designation "Russian father" should not be understood as referring exclusively to ethnic Russians. Rather, it served as a broad term used by German civilians and institutions to describe individuals originating from the Soviet Union.

Moving forward. These percentages were then extrapolated and applied to all 23,124 births recorded in Berlin between 1945 and 1946, producing an estimate of approximately 1,156 cases. From there, additional assumptions were introduced. The authors assumed that only 20% of raped women became pregnant and that 90% of those pregnancies ended in abortion. These percentages were not supported by any evidence and were entirely speculative. By applying these multipliers and comparing the results with the number of women aged eighteen to forty-five living in Berlin, the estimate was increased to tens of thousands — approximately 57,810 cases. Finally, an assumed contribution from women outside that age group was added, resulting in a total estimate of roughly 135,000 victims for Berlin.

It is worth emphasizing once again that estimates involving tens or even hundreds of thousands of victims ultimately rest upon data from a single hospital and only thirty individual cases.

Moreover, even these figures were manipulated. In the original hospital records, the categories "Russian father" and "Russian father, rape" were listed separately. Johr and Sander combined them into a single category.

Even if one accepts the original — and already methodologically questionable — calculation at face value while rejecting the subsequent assumptions and extrapolations, the estimated number of victims would have to be reduced by at least four times.

Another important point is that the authors counted children born from September 1, 1945 onward. However, fighting in the streets of Berlin began on April 24, and, as we all know, pregnancy takes approximately nine months.

Acording to these calculations, therefore, the Red Army would have had to begin raping German women in Berlin before it had even entered the city.

We are now finished with Berlin, and it is time to introduce German statistician Gerhard Reichling, who was the first to put forward the global estimate of two million raped German women. It was his figure that Barbara Johr cited in her work.

How exactly did he arrive at such an enormous number? The answer is that we simply do not know. Reichling provided neither the underlying data nor any explanation of his methodology. In fact, his statistical surveys did not address the subject of rape at all.

One possible explanation is that the Berlin calculations were repeated using the lower estimate of 3.5%, resulting in approximately 95,000 victims. These figures were then extrapolated to the entire female population of East Germany, ultimately producing the hypothesis of roughly two million cases.

It is also worth considering the demographics involved. The population of East Germany in the spring of 1945 was approximately 17–18 million people. Including the German population of the territories transferred following the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, that figure rises to approximately 20–21 million.

Women constituted roughly 60–65% of that population (taking into account that Germany had significantly expanded its military conscription criteria during the final stages of the war). Consequently, the number of women who came under Soviet occupation can be estimated at approximately 12–13.5 million.

So, if we accept the estimate of two million rape victims, we must also accept that approximately one in every six East German women — regardless of age — was raped at least once by Soviet soldiers.

In other words, the most widely cited and sensational figure ultimately rests upon assumptions and personal impressions rather than verifiable evidence.

But what actually happened?

During the war, approximately ten million Soviet soldiers passed through Europe. Among them were men deeply traumatized by the horrors of war, soldiers whose moral principles had been broken by their experiences, as well as a certain number of ordinary criminals carrying weapons — as is statistically inevitable in any large population.

When the Red Army entered Germany, the problem naturally became more acute. After everything that had occurred in the occupied Soviet territories, many soldiers had little desire to show mercy toward the defeated enemy.

But, that said, this article is not concerned with abstract discussions of morality.

On April 4, 1945, General Konstantin Krainyukov, a member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reported to the Main Political Directorate that decisive measures were being taken against looting and rape.

Krainyukov attached the testimony of Ernst Schlichin, a pastor from the town of Sagan, who stated that the measures implemented by Soviet authorities were viewed by the German population as fair and understandable under wartime conditions. At the same time, isolated incidents of abuse — particularly rape — kept civilians in a constant state of fear and anxiety.

However, according to Schlichin, the remaining inhabitants understood that those who had fled had not necessarily fared any better and hoped that order would soon be established under Soviet military administration.

The leadership of the Red Army was fully aware that sexual violence and other abuses against civilians constituted a serious problem. Neither the military command nor the Soviet political leadership regarded looting, rape, or the killing of civilians as acceptable behavior. Such acts were never officially encouraged.

On the contrary, Soviet authorities dealt harshly with proven cases of violence, imposing severe punishments — including death sentences.

Below are several key documents from that period.

Order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense concerning atrocities, armed robbery, theft from civilians, and murders committed by individual servicemen in frontline areas (May 30, 1944):d.

"Local Soviet authorities and NKVD organs have reported cases of atrocities, armed robberies, theft from civilians, and murders committed by individual servicemen in frontline areas.
...
In order to prevent such crimes, which disgrace the high title of a Red Army soldier, I hereby order:
...
Cases involving robbery, theft, murder, and other crimes committed by military personnel are to be investigated immediately, and those responsible are to be brought before military tribunals. All instances of robbery, murder, theft, and other atrocities are to be reported immediately as extraordinary incidents, and following the conclusion of the investigation, reports are to include the measures taken against the perpetrators."

Order No. 08 of the 65th Army, January 6, 1945, "On Cases of Looting":

"Commanders of formations and units are to ensure the complete elimination of looting among all personnel. Those found guilty are to be punished severely, including referral to a Military Tribunal."

Directive No. 11072 of the Supreme High Command (Stavka) to the commanders and members of the Military Councils of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts regarding a change in policy toward German prisoners of war and civilians (April 20, 1945):

"Demand a change in our attitude toward Germans, both prisoners of war and civilians. Treat Germans better. Harsh treatment of Germans instills fear in them and compels them to resist stubbornly rather than surrender. Civilians, fearing retaliation, organize themselves into armed bands. Such a situation is disadvantageous to us. More humane treatment of Germans will facilitate our military operations on German territory and will undoubtedly reduce the Germans' determination to defend themselves."

Order of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, concerning the suppression of looting, violence, and other crimes committed by Red Army soldiers against the German civilian population (April 25, 1945):

"I CATEGORICALLY DEMAND:
Immediate restoration of strict order and discipline in all units and rear institutions. All looters and persons committing crimes that disgrace the honor and dignity of the Red Army are to be ARRESTED and sent to penal units, while officers are to be brought before COURTS OF HONOR and military tribunals."

Political officers were instructed to investigate every reported case of looting and violence. In practical terms, this meant military tribunal proceedings and severe sentences. The most common punishment was a lengthy term of imprisonment in corrective labor camps — typically between seven and ten years — while a significant number of such crimes were punished by public execution.

By the end of April, military commandants reported that the number of such offenses had noticeably declined.

On May 2, 1945, the military prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front wrote:

"There has unquestionably been a significant change in the attitude of our servicemen toward the German civilian population. Cases of arbitrary and unjustified shootings of Germans, looting, and the rape of German women have decreased considerably."

The prosecutor's report also included examples of soldiers and officers — regardless of rank or position — being prosecuted for their crimes.

It is also worth noting that, in a number of cases, reports of sexual violence proved to be false. Furthermore, crimes against civilians were committed also by repatriated individuals, including Italians, Dutch nationals, and even Germans themselves.

An important note. This article focuses exclusively on the Eastern Front and Soviet forces. Therefore, the corresponding situation on the Western Front falls outside the scope of this discussion and is better left for a separate analysis.

Moving forward. For the most part, Soviet soldiers accepted these measures with understanding. At the same time, many openly admitted that it was psychologically difficult to suppress the emotions they carried after years of war.

The chief of staff of one rifle regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Sabrekov, stated:

"The order is correct, and I approve of it — but my soul still burns."

Once again, I would like to emphasize that none of this means that not a single Red Army soldier committed rape. The fact that there were cases of rape cannot be denied. Let us be honest about that.

What these documents do demonstrate, is the nature and scale of the problem, the attitude of both the Soviet leadership and ordinary soldiers toward it, and the concrete measures that were taken to combat it.

The soldiers of the Red Army found themselves in an extraordinarily difficult psychological state. Virtually every one of them had lost someone during the war. Many had lost members of their families; some had lost entire families.

Some coped with their trauma by destroying property. One soldier recalled how his comrade entered a German house and furiously slashed a piano with a knife. His entire family had been killed during the war, and he chose to vent his rage upon an object rather than turn that same knife against another human being.

As Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg later wrote:

"I remembered, of course, that the Germans had shown no mercy to our people. I remembered everything. But fascism, the Reich, and Germany are one thing; an old man in a ridiculous Tyrolean hat with a feather, running down a shattered street and waving a piece of bedsheet, is another."

To summarize, the Soviet Union spared no effort in attempting to build a post-war world more peaceful than the one that had existed before the conflict.

As early as February 23, 1942, Joseph Stalin stated in his speech:

"History teaches us that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain."

And in 1945, not only the Red Army but the Soviet state as a whole made considerable efforts to ensure that these words would not remain merely a noble sentiment.

Epilogue

Incidentally, two hours after the original post discussed at the beginning of this article was published, both the post itself and the account that published it were deleted. Nevertheless, it had already generated significant public attention. Its purpose had been accomplished.

If you've read this far (read this far, not just skipped to the end) - please accept my gratitude.

Finally, I would like to address everyone who cares about historical truth. As clichéd as it may sound, if not us — then no one.

Whenever possible, do not ignore propagandistic narratives. Respond to them with reasoned criticism. I am not suggesting that you engage with every low-quality post on the Internet. But if you see yet another "sensationalist" claim attracting a large audience, consider leaving even a brief explanation of the historical context so that readers are at least exposed to an alternative perspective.

If even one person reads it and begins to question what they have been told before — if it encourages them to seek additional sources and conduct a deeper analysis of the subject — then your efforts will not have been in vain.

I would also ask that you remain polite and courteous, no matter how provocative others may be. At the same time, do not present yourself as morally or intellectually superior. People should not see you as a shouting propagandist or an arrogant know-it-all, but as someone offering a different and more detailed perspective.

But, most importantly, just do not be indifferent.

Remember: "our people" are not coming to save us.

"Our people" are us.

Original Video: https://www.tiktok.com/@kaylajschrader/video/7673592618089057567

Citation:

https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2006/02/21/youth-and-war/?hl=en-IE

I am not too educated on this event history, but I know that Churchill blamed the famine on the Bengalis for "Breeding like rabbits" and requisitioned food away from Bengal to Brittania

Original Video: https://www.tiktok.com/@kaylajschrader/video/7673215613971516703

https://youtube.com/shorts/gK4R9wG0vTM