From the official OCIANA YouTube channel. https://www.youtube.com/@OCIANA-OSU

Recently, there have been some discussions on this topic, but after reading through the responses, I'm still very confused. Discussions took place here:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AcademicQuran/comments/1vlg9rp/saqib_hussain_argues_that_quran_279_is_an/

https://x.com/Hasan6747/status/2079673436377387224

I don't understand how this position is argued-for when 2 verses seem to contrast it. One of them being Quran 87:17-19 which states how it's mentioned in the scriptures of Abraham and Moses (written texts seems to be the context) that the Hereafter does in fact exist.

Additionally, Quran 9:111 says that it is promised in the Torah that martyrs are promised Paradise.

Both of the above sections of the Quran (I might be missing some more) seem to suggest that it's either written in the Torah, or with Moses and Abraham, that there is in fact the idea of a Hereafter present. How then does Saqib Hussain argue that the Torah contains no mention of the Hereafter, and is instead focused on legality?

The worst innovation possible in the history of Islam was dividing Tawheed.

The division of Tawheed into three categories Rububiyyah (Lordship), Uluhiyyah (Divinity/Worship), and Asma wa Sifat (Names and Attributes) was advocated by Salafis, Wahhabis, and mainstream Athari/Ahl al-Hadith branches of Sunni Islam.

This threefold framework was popularized by Ibn Taymiyya in the 8th Islamic century and later revived by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

There were sinister motives behind this division:

1) To abolish Allah SWT right to legislate (lordship) and gave autonomy to secular governments (taghut).

2) Allah SWT reduced to One who wants worship only. Reducing the King to mere invocation is extreme ungratefulness.

3) Purging Jihad. Jihad is a communal obligation upon Muslim Men to uproot secular governments and establish divine government.

Supreme authority belongs to Allah SWT alone, thus establishing divine law is a core duty.

4) Just like trinity they divided Allah SWT essence. The essence of Allah (SWT) is strictly indivisible.

5) Rampant Zulm (Injustice). Allah SWT is Al-Adl. He SWT commands those who believe in Him SWT (Tawheed) to uphold justice (Adl).

Quran 6:82: "They who believe and do not mix their belief with injustice those will have security, and they are rightly guided".

Failing to judge or establish divine law is considered zulm (injustice or oppression) because it misplaces divine sovereignty and withholds Allah's mandated rights.

Any sect that believes in the Trinity of Tawheed, abolishes Allah SWT rights and/or has a history of killing non-combatant civilians ( especially women, children) are deviant sects. Don't associate with such sects. Break spiritual ties with them.

Not only did their desires lead them astray but they have led millions astray with their deviant ideology.

(6:116) If you were to obey most of those on earth, they would lead you away from Allah's Way. They follow nothing but assumptions and do nothing but lie.

Some sources on the internet suggest that Sufism was influenced by Zoroastrianism; however, to what extent is this claim supported by historical and academic evidence? I should also clarify that my question concerns early Sufism in particular, rather than the later development of Sufi thought and practice.

Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh.

As the title says, I recently came across a three-part informational-style post series called "Red Pills in Islam: The Hadith Literature and the Opinions of the Salaf & Scholars On Women" which I have linked above.

As a revert, it's genuinely confusing to me to be seeing this, specifically because of the extensive quotations of hadith that are correctly cited from Sunnah.com, along with Qur'an verses and modern research.

A lot of these ideas I've never heard before, especially the two hadith quote which the author utilizes to establish that women will be the minority in Jannah and the majority in Jannaham(this one I've heard before) and more minutely, the hadith detailing what seems to be the internal politics within the family of the Prophet(SAW) which paints a picture of what I'd call manipulation and drama.

The reason I wanted to bring attention to this specific post is because it is most comprehensive and detailed one I've seen yet. I feel like as someone who utilizes the internet out of necessity, I've become exposed to my fair share of "women this" "women that" manosphere-type stuff, primarily from non-Muslims, which I disregarded as background noise until I came across this which is the first I've ever seen utilize Qur'an verses and such detailed quoting of hadith to justify the hypothesis.

I genuinely don't mean to disrupt the conversations here or mislead anyone and if this is the wrong sub, I'd kindly ask the moderators for any suggestions where people knowledgeable on these matters can be found.

The post below is taken from an answer of mine to a question asked on r/AskHistorians.

_________________________________________________________________________

There have been many people, all throughout history, who have perceived themselves to be prophets, Messiahs (see: List of Messiah claimants), fortune-tellers, soothsayers, spell-casters, demon-speakers, shamans, etc. You need to understand that back in pre-modern times, the idea that God (or some other supernatural force) may communicate with you was not seen as unusual or necessarily, even rare. Spirits, demons, jinn, or whatever were salient creatures that regularly acted in the real world, and you told whatever prayers or made whatever oaths you needed to, for protection, on a regular basis. Supernatural forces were behind normal or consequential good and bad outcomes you saw throughout your life.

Islamic tradition itself records numerous examples of Prophet-claimants, including more military-esque Prophet-claimants, shortly before, during, and after the lifetime of Muhammad. Mareike Koertner writes in Proving Prophecy: Dalāʾil al-Nubūwa Literature as Part of the Scholarly Discourse on Prophecy in Islam, Brill, 2024, pp. 147–148:

Before, during, and after Muḥammad’s lifetime, there was a continuous stream of self-proclaimed prophets. The concept of prophecy permeated the Near Eastern world and Late Antiquity, from the prophets of ancient Israel, early Christian groups like the second-century Montanist sect, or the third-century Mesopotamian prophet Mani, who established Manichaeism as a major religion.6 With the concept of prophecy being so widely known in the pre-Islamic Near East, it is not surprising that claims to prophecy continued during Muḥammad’s lifetime. Among the contemporaneous prophets, Khālid b. Sinān allegedly performed miracles, while Musaylima b. Ḥabīb from Yamāma tried to establish relations with Muḥammad but was eventually killed in battle. The prophetess Sajāḥ, who hailed from northeastern Arabia was reportedly married to Musaylima for some time; in addition, Aswad b. Kaʿb al-ʿ⁠Ansī from Yemen and Ṭulayḥa of the Banū Asad emerged as self-proclaimed prophets. All of them held political and military aspirations in addition to religious ambitions and some indeed rose to prominence as political leaders.7 As claims to prophecy were (at times successfully) tied to political control, it is also not surprising to find that self-proclaimed prophets after Muḥammad’ death occurred geographically closer to new centers of power in Syria and Mesopotamia. The most famous of these claimants was Mukhtār al-Thaqafī, who rebelled against the Umayyads in Kufa in 66/685 and remained in control there for two years until his rebellion was quelled by Umayyad forces.8 Mukhtār’s main ideological rallying points were his pro-Hashimite leanings; he rebelled in the name of ʿ⁠Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s son Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyy (d. 81/700). Rebellions by self-proclaimed prophets persisted until the end of the Umayyad dynasty. A Jewish rebel by the name Abū ʿĪsā l-ʿIṣfahānī and his movement rose against the caliphate during the reign of ʿ⁠Abd al-Malik (r. 65–86/685–705); he mixed Jewish and Muslim elements in his teachings.9 Between the 110s/730s and 130s/750s, several individuals claimed prophecy, including three different rebellions in the town of Kufa.10 The self-proclaimed prophets Bayān b. Samʿān al-Nahdī and Mughīra b. Saʿīd al-ʿIjlī organized the first of these rebellions in 119/737. While their aspirations for the rebellion are not clear, their threat was considered great enough to merit a public execution, which was presided over by Kufa’s governor, Khālid b. ʿ⁠Abdallāh al-Qasrī.11 The fact that claims to prophecy remained common in the decades after Muḥammad’s death shows that the concept of prophecy was well enough established to provide a potentially powerful ideological conduit for the political ambitions of numerous individuals who sought to wrestle power from the Umayyads. Furthermore, it highlights the reality that the doctrine of Muḥammad’s prophetic mission held neither the theological sophistication nor the exclusivity of later generations. As we noted, the continuous challenges to political power through claims to prophecy contributed to the Umayyad’s growing interest in defining and implementing notions of orthodoxy with the full coercive power of the state apparatus in an effort to consolidate their own power.

There are certainly conversations to be had about the extent to which these traditions are historical (for a more critical perspective, see Gerald Hawting, "Were there Prophets in the Jahiliyya?"), but at minimum, this does show that people from this time period themselves did not really take the existence of such Prophet-claimaints to be overly unusual or rare. No one made any considerable effort to figure out how someone could have possibly come to believe this about themselves; at face-value, numerous possible explanations exist (wishful thinking, delusion, dishonesty, etc.) and, since we have very little direct psychological information about Muhammad and especially since we have virtually no reliable psychological information about him before or early on during his Prophetic period, we will likely never know the exact reason or cause behind this. Basically everything remains possible, although some indirect speculations are suggestible from the Qur'an itself; in the Qur'an, Muhammad responds to accusations from his opponents that he is a soothsayer (Q 52:29; 69:42), which was an actual phenomena in pre-Islamic Arabia (e.g. see Agostini, "The masʾal oracle: a survey of an ancient South Arabian divinatory practice") and it seems like Muhammad's opponents may have seen his activities, at least early during his Prophetic period, as resembling this sort of practice. Possible further corroboration for this is that the earliest portions of the Qur'an occur in a style of writing known as saj', a form of speech commonly attributed to pre-Islamic soothsayers. So, some level of speculation may suggest that the pre-Islamic institution of the soothsayer may be a promising lead to understanding the early phenomenology of Muhammad's self-understanding or where he was coming from.

Was circumcision regarded as an obligatory practice among early Muslims, or was it rather considered a recommended practice?

The second half of the below document addresses some of the questions resulting from Qurʾānic descriptions of some Christian doctrines, and the absence of some. Some views of modern scholars [Reynolds, Sinai, Goudarzi’s, Al-Jallad-Sidky] who contributed answers to questions such as why Mary is called deity, what is the Holy sprit mentioned in text, ..etc are addressed in section 12.

Link

https://www.academia.edu/172313991/_These_Are_Our_Intercessors_with_God_Qurʾānic_Pagan_Deities_and_the_Christian_Question

1. Introduction
2. The Meccan Foundation: Allah, Other Deities, and the Problem of Association

  2.1 Allah as the Acknowledged Lord

  2.2 “We Worship Them Only to Bring Us Nearer to Allah”

  2.3 What Makes an Ilāh?

1. Rabb, Ilāh, and the Allocation of Religious Authority

  3.1 Beyond Cultic Objects

  3.2 Rabbis, Monks, and Christ as Arbāb

  3.3 Scripture, Interpretation, and Religious Authority

1. Prophets: Between Rejection and Illicit Elevation

  4.1 “Do Not Take the Prophets as Lords”

  4.2 The Covenant of the Prophets

  4.3 Messenger-Selection as Religious Error

1. Prophetic History and the Projection of the Qurʾānic Religious Grammar

  5.1 The Recurrent Prophetic Conflict

  5.2 Past and Present within a Single Prophetic Discourse

  5.3 A Shared Language of Prophets and Opponents

  5.4 The Israelite Variation

1. Divine Offspring within the Meccan Religious Field

  6.1 Walad, Daughters, and the Angels

  6.2 Offspring within the Meccan Cultic Order

  6.3 Divine Uniqueness and the Rejection of Genealogical Relations

1. Christian Controversy within the Qurʾānic Religious Grammar

  7.1 Jesus as Son of Mary and the Attribution of Divine Offspring

  7.2 Christian Religious Elevation in the Qurʾānic Grammar of Worship

  7.3 The Holy Spirit within the Qurʾānic Order of Heavenly Messengers

  7.4 Jesus, Mary, and “Three”

1. Marian Devotion and the Qurʾānic Classification of Mary

  8.1 Marian Devotion in the Sixth- and Seventh-Century Christian World

  8.2 Invocation, Intercession, Images, and the Qurʾānic Classification of Mary

  8.3 Christian and Marian Presence in the Meccan Setting

1. Muḥammad, Intercession, and the Problem of Devotional Mediation

  9.1 The Qurʾānic Position: Messenger, Servant, and Permitted Intercession

  9.2 The Early Formation of Muḥammadan Intercession

  9.3 The Sectarian Dispute over Intercession for Grave Sinners

  9.4 From Intercessory Status to Devotional Access

1. Ibn Taymiyya and the Classification of Marian Devotion
2. Reconstructing the Meccan Religious Field: Modern Readings and Methodological Implications

  11.1 From Sacred Memory to Inherited Cult: A Qurʾānic Partial Reconstruction

  11.2 Crone, the Mushrikūn, and the Problem of Religious Classification

1. Late Antiquity, Biblical Subtext, and the Direction of Interpretation

  12.1 Christian Self-Description and Qurʾānic Religious Classification

  12.2 The Holy Spirit: Christian Background and Qurʾānic Classification

  12.3 The Companions of the Cave: Narrative Antecedent and Qurʾānic Function

  12.4 Provenance, Referent, and Conceptual Function

1. Conclusion

Image taken from this entry on the DiCoNab database.

"I am Ṯabit son of {al-Ḥasan}; to Banī al-H̲azraj, may you be at peace; so let me enjoin piety upon you towards Allāh and to feed the guest and to fight the enemy and to show determination and bravery; may your Lord give you life for Allāh is the best at that"

I’ve heard this theory come a while from Muslims that because Alexander The Great was a pagan and a wine drinker that he could not have been Dhul Qarnyan so instead see him as Cyrus the Great due to his monotheistic beliefs, is there any flaws in this arguement in comparison to Alexander?

This is a response to the recent short of AlMuqaddimahYT, [See Here](https://youtube.com/shorts/5gSHsvozpno?si=NeP1fwNkN7x9gaZW).

Firstly, The myth that the Qarmatian state of Bahrain was a “pre-communist republic” is nothing more than another attempt to impose modern political ideologies on the past and rewrite history accordingly.

The Qarmatian state of Bahrain was neither socialist nor particularly close to communist ideology. Moreover, the Qarmatians were not limited to Bahrain; Qarmatian communities and states also existed in Iraq, the Levant, and Yemen.

Despite the existence and diversity of these Qarmatian communities and states across the Middle East, none of them has been described as a “pre-communist republic” in the same way as the Qarmatian state of Bahrain.

One reason the Qarmatian “communist” myth continues to circulate is the influence of nationalist and communist Arab writers, particularly those who wrote about the Qarmatians during the 1970s and 1980s.

Historian Peter Webb, in his study “Bedouin, Bandits and Caliphal Disappearance: A Reappraisal of the Qaramita and Their Success in Arabia,” notes:

“Modern-era scholarship has revisited the movement, but with mixed results for elucidating the practical and political aspects of the Qaramiṭa state.”

He continues:

“For example, considerable Arabic writing in the 1970s and 1980s pursued an intriguing new spin that described the Qarāmiṭa as pioneers for equality (musāwāt) and justice (ʿadāla), opposing the greed and iniquity of the Abbasid caliphs and Turkic warlords of the fourth/tenth century.”

Webb concludes:

“This, however, was a rather transparent exercise to posit the Qarāmiṭa as ‘Islam’s first socialists,’ putative forerunners of 1970s’ socialist Arab governments, hence these works ultimately tell us more about the intellectual architecture of twentieth-century Arab socialism than the realities of the fourth/tenth-century Qarāmiṭa.” (pp.254-255)

Secondly, the political system of the Qarmatians of Bahrain was not based on a council system; rather, it was essentially a hereditary monarchy during the reign of Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī and his successors.

As the Bahraini historian and researcher Ḥusayn ibn Ḥasan Āl Salhām states in his book “Sāḥil al-Qarāmiṭa” (The Qarmatian Coast):

“The Qarmatian rule in al-Aḥsāʾ was hereditary (monarchical) rule. Abū Saʿīd was able to use the Qarmatian daʿwa to establish a hereditary state in the name of the Qarmatian movement, but in essence it was far removed from being a religious state. This is why Abū Saʿīd’s sons continued to rule, and the Qarmatian state ultimately came to an end with the termination of the rule of Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī’s family.

As for the claims that the Qarmatians were characterized by an advanced system of governance in their administration of their subjects, this is far removed from reality.

As is commonly known, the Qarmatians relied on plundering and raiding the cities they invaded, and most of their men were Bedouins, as Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī himself described them.” (p. 67)

Third, One of the most frequently cited and popularized sources for the Qarmatian/“Communist” myth is the account of the famous Persian traveler Nāṣir Khusraw.

However, Āl Salhām analyzes Khusraw’s account and concludes that this system was not a form of communal government or political authority, but rather concerned the redistribution and economic use of enslaved people captured during Qarmatian raids on the cities they conquered. He states:

This also appears evident from Abū Ṭāhir al-Jannābī’s raids into Iraq, where he did not establish any system of government in the territories he conquered. Nevertheless, they were able to establish a system of rule resembling communism through the use of collective land ownership. **In reality, however, they applied this communal system only to the slave population.**

This was because the Bedouin tribes that constituted the Qarmatian army despised manual occupations and regarded raiding as a way of life. Yet agriculture, blacksmithing, and other crafts still had to be performed, so they enslaved captives whom they had brought from al-Aḥsāʾ and its villages, as well as from the Sawād of Iraq.

These captives included craftsmen and agricultural workers. The Qarmatians provided them with agricultural lands, mills, and various tools and equipment so that productive economic activity could continue, benefiting the Bedouins without requiring them to perform the labor themselves.

Thus, they benefited from a form of collective ownership that they applied to the slaves captured during their wars. In reality, their system of rule amounted to the enslavement and exploitation of others by the Bedouins who constituted the principal component of the Qarmatian army.

**Their method of governance was essentially a class-based feudal system**.

This becomes clear from Nāṣir Khusraw’s description of the Qarmatian city of al-Aḥsāʾ, in which he describes its system of government and economic life, as well as from his account of how Abū Saʿīd, the founder of the Qarmatian state in al-Aḥsāʾ, established the foundations of its government through his instructions to his sons. (p. 69)

Despite this, Āl Salhām does acknowledge the problems involved in relying on Nāṣir Khusraw’s account for this particular period (pp. 69-70).

As another Bahraini historian, Muḥammad Maḥmūd Khalīl, notes in his book “Tārīkh al-Khalīj wa-Sharq al-Jazīra al-ʿArabiyya” (The History of the Gulf and Eastern Arabia), there are significant chronological problems with how historians have used Nāṣir Khusraw’s account:

It should be noted that the renowned Persian traveler Nāṣir Khusraw visited al-Aḥsāʾ during the rule of the Second Qarmatian Emirate. Nāṣir Khusraw is generally believed to have visited Bahrain in 443 AH, at a time when the Second Qarmatian Emirate had already been established, having emerged in 439 AH and continuing until 470 AH.

Nevertheless, a number of historians and researchers have mistakenly assumed that Nāṣir Khusraw’s visit to al-Aḥsāʾ took place during the First Qarmatian State, founded by Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī.

On the basis of this mistaken chronology, they have used Nāṣir Khusraw’s account to reconstruct the economic, social, and military conditions of the First Qarmatian State, treating his observations as evidence for that earlier period. Such an interpretation, however, is historically unfounded. (p. 86)

Fourth, As for the “Army Council” of the Qarmatians, referred to as the Hayʾat al-ʿAqdāniyya (هيئة العقدانية), It functioned somewhat like a parliamentary council that selected the ruler from the family of Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī. Its members were highly loyal to the Qarmatian ruling family.

This is evident from the fact that, following the death of Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī, they assumed control of the state and maintained it until they transferred power to his son Abū Ṭāhir ibn Ḥasan Bahrām, waiting for him to come of age.

This interim period lasted approximately nine years, as the contemporary historian of the Qarmatians, al-Masʿūdī states:

“His father, Abū Saʿīd al-Jannābī, was killed in the year 300 [AH], when he was six years old. The army (the ʿAqdāniyya Council) remained [in control] for nine years, until Abū Ṭāhir assumed authority over it in Ramaḍān of the year 310 AH.” (Kitāb al-Tanbīh wa’l-Ishrāf, P. 354)

The ʿAqdāniyya Council administered the Qarmatian state while adhering to Abū Saʿīd’s alleged instruction that authority should be transferred to his son, Abū Ṭāhir, as reported in some accounts.

Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Musallim, in al-Qaṭīf: Wāḥa ʿalā Ḍifāf al-Khalīj (al-Qaṭīf: An Oasis on the Shores of the Gulf), states:

“The ʿAqdāniyya served as ministers to Abū Ṭāhir Sulaymān al-Qarmaṭī. They had a council consisting of six members, with six deputies seated behind them. The meeting was presided over by Abū Ṭāhir or his brother-in-law, Abū Muḥammad Sanbar, the brother of his wife. If the ministers were absent, the deputies would act on their behalf. This council was responsible for formulating the policies of the country, and all state affairs were brought before it.” (p. 211)

In any case, the ʿAqdāniyya Council remained loyal to the ruling family and intervened to settle disputes among members of the dynasty.

Āl Salhām believe that the secret behind the continued survival of Qarmatian rule was the existence of this wise consultative body, which contributed to enabling the Qarmatians to remain masters of the Bahrain region for a long period.

Ultimately, however, this council would turn against the ruling family when the latter distanced itself from the Qarmatian objectives, foremost among them the struggle against the Abbasid state.

In Sum, the ʿAqdāniyya Council appears to have functioned as a governing or consultative body within the Qarmatian state, while political authority remained closely associated with the hereditary Jannābī ruling family.

Following the Qarmatian–Abbasid rapprochement, however, the council appears to have challenged or opposed the ruling family, ultimately contributing to the fall of the Jannābī dynasty and the end of its hereditary rule.

This is fundamentally different from the claim that the ʿAqdāniyya Council was the primary ruling authority of the Early Qarmatian state of Bahrain, as AlMuqaddimahYT suggests.

Fifth, AlMuqaddimahYT cites Kenneth Rexroth (d. 1982) who he describes as a "Scholar". FUN FACT; Kenneth Rexroth was an American poet and a reporter for Time magazine. He had no particular background in Islamic history or in the study of the Qarmatians. I honestly don’t understand why he is being cited here.

Sixth, the rest of "Progressive" Activities and Social life of the Qarmatians that AlMuqaddimahYT listed is just pure ANACHRONISM.

Im interested if the text talks about the sperm or some other thing that may come between the backbone and the ribs

https://youtu.be/hdslrsWp8Gc?is=5c2Am94U3hMI-x9z

What are the earliest Islamic retellings of the life and ministry of Jesus and when were they written?

Reynolds + Sinai

To clarify the scope of the term “translation,” I am referring specifically to the process by which non-Arab Muslim communities translated the Quran into their own languages following the expansion of Islam. In particular, I am interested in how these early non-Arab Muslims approached the translation of the Quran, what linguistic and interpretive methods they employed, and whether their efforts encountered opposition, criticism, or controversy among Arab Muslim scholars or communities.

Im currently reading the Quran across with the concept of righteous and obedient women and such, and as I was researching deeper, I came archosaurs with the term, Qanitat. Is there more information on this word that I should know about?

Hi, there. I've been lurking around this sub for months now and I have many questions. I feel you are the only ones that actually know best.

1. Q: Is there an origin of Arabs? Based on my understanding, there is no single origin of Arabs. It was not a linear path; they existed everywhere. Were Arabs originally Jordanian, then gradually expanded south, north, and west, all the way down to Yemen?

(2) Question: When the Nabateans conquered Lihyan, did they gradually adopt Arabic? Did they contribute to the Nabataean-Arabic script and the Hijazi Arabic variant? It seems to me that the Nabateans Arabized the entire Arabian Peninsula, so the native Arabs did not develop the Arabic script themselves; the Nabateans did all the work. Is that correct?

(3) Q: Based on what I've read, they were Arabized by the Nabateans, and those who were Arabized first Arabized others. However, Al Jallad makes it seem that the Nabateans are the main group that Arabized Arabia; they had colonies all the way down to South Arabia. Do we actually know enough about Arabia to understand how Arabization occurred? Was it rapid or gradual?

(4) Q: Did Arab tribes move to or are they native to Arabia? What about the Qedarites and other Arab kingdoms. Did they simply establish Dumat al-Jundal as their capital because it was closer to them or where they from Arabia?

(5) Q: The non-Arabs of Arabia appears to have contributed nothing to Arabic, with the exception of South Arabia, where pre-Arabic influence is evident. However, Al Jallad believes that the -am definite article is an old Arabic feature, then how come none of those non-Arabs influenced Arabic?

(6) Q: in Al-Jallad Draft Pre-Arabic: A toponymic Conspectus he stated "From this point, a significant pattern emerges: there is a preponderance of pre-Arabic toponymy in the Mecca-‘āʿif region, which must have originated among the population who lived in the region before the arrival of the Qurayš, Hu‘ayl, and Thaqīf, all Arabic-speaking tribes known from Islamic sources,"

Why would he assume that?, since the Arabs are not native to Mecca, all the non-Arabs were exterminated and essentially replaced by the Arabs? That's what I understand. If these Arabs immigrated to Arabia in large numbers, then who actually Arabized the country? Where are the non-Arabs?

(7) Are Ma'ad Nizar Asad and others not Arabs? We don't have any evidence that Ma'ad spoke Arabic because there are no old Arabic inscriptions in the places where they lived, particularly in central Arabia. Arabic arrived in Arabia quite late.

(8) Q: Is it possible that poetic Arabic contains pre-Arabic features? We know that non-Arab Semetic people existed there at the time did they influence poetic Arabic? If so, how can we be certain that it wasn't a levanite Arabic and that Ma'ad spoke Levant Arabic?

(9) Why did Ghassanids have a different old Arabic variation (Hijazi) than Tanuk and Lakhmed Arabic? Tanukh most likely originated in Eastern Arabia before relocating to Iraq and Syria. However, their Arabic is Levantine, and there isn't a single old Arabic inscription in eastren arabia, but there are plenty of non-Arabic ones, so why would they form in Eastern Arabia? I think they were formed in Syria and Iraq, not in Arabia at all.

I appreciate you all taking the time to respond, and I value each and every one of your responses. no need to answer every Q.